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AUTOMATIC OUTS: SALARY ARBITRATION
(#*(*N*I NIPPON
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL (1 PPO
DAVID L. SNYDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Major League Baseball (MLB) has experienced a dramatic increase in the
influx of Japanese players following Hideo Nomo's (EXA ) defection to
the MLB in 1995.1 One consequence of this phenomenon is that interest in
Japanese baseball among non-Japanese researchers has increased significantly
over the past decade. However, relatively little scholarship outside of Japan
has been produced on the business of Japanese professional baseball. Cultural
and language barriers, coupled with the highly confidential nature of data
regarding the business operations of Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB)(B ) have created imposing challenges for Western scholars
interested in this subject.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the fundamental components of
salary arbitration - in Japanese baseball, and provide an
overview of all the salary arbitration cases in Japan to date. The research
presented herein is based upon original source documents in Japanese, coupled
with secondary sources in English.
Since this paper is written primarily for a North American audience, labor
relations and salary arbitration in the NPB is compared and contrasted with the
MLB. At the outset, a brief overview of labor relations and salary arbitration
in the MLB is presented, followed by a description of labor relations and
salary arbitration in the NPB. Next, a detailed examination of all the salary
arbitration cases in the NPB is provided. The article concludes with an
analysis of the possible reasons for the differences in labor relations and salary
arbitration between the leagues, along with speculation regarding the possible
* David L. Snyder is Full Professor in the Sport Management Department at the State
University of New York at Cortland, and a part-time Full Professor of Sport Management at
Tompkins Cortland Community College. He has been a member of the New York bar since 1986.
Prior to arriving at SUNY Cortland, he was president of a sports marketing company based in Tokyo,
Japan. This article was based, in part, on research conducted in partial satisfaction of the author's
PhD requirements at the Deutsche Sporthochschule K6ln.
1. ROBERT WHITING, THE SAMURAI WAY OF BASEBALL: THE IMPACT OF ICHIRO AND THE NEW
WAVE FROM JAPAN 205, 207 (2004).
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future of salary arbitration in the NPB.
Because this paper was written primarily for a North American audience,
Japanese names have been Romanized and Westernized (given name first,
family name second). However, Japanese names and key terms that appear in
this article are also followed by the Japanese versions, which appear in
parentheses.
With respect to translations, functional equivalents have been used for
Japanese terms in lieu of literal translations. For example, in the NPB, the
Japanese word for the head of the Central and Pacific Leagues has been
translated as "president," but the actual literal meaning is closer to "chairman."
The designation "president" was used because in the MLB, the head of the
American and National Leagues is referred to by that title, so the same
terminology was used for the NPB. 2
II. LABOR RELATIONS AND SALARY ARBITRATION IN MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL
While unions have existed in professional baseball in the United States
since the 1800s, the origins of the current union, the Major League Baseball
Players' Association (MLBPA), only came about in 1954. 3 Initially, the
MLBPA's influence was limited to issues such as insurance and pensions, but
that quickly changed when Marvin Miller, formerly a negotiator for the United
Steelworkers of America, assumed the mantle of MLBPA executive director in
1966. 4
As a result of collective bargaining, the power structure in the MLB
realized a fundamental shift from a system in which the owners and the
commissioner had absolute power, to a structure, forged under the auspicious
of labor law, in which power is shared between the players and owners. 5
Through the collective bargaining process, the terms and conditions of
employment were negotiated between the players and owners, with the
ultimate goal of entering into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). 6 The
first CBA in MLB, which was the first such agreement in any sports league,
2. The author would like to express his appreciation to his wife, Mari Takeishi Snyder, and
Kensuke Nakata (rP 9 0 1P), an undergraduate student in the Sport Management Department at the
State University of New York at Cortland, for their help and assistance with the Japanese translations
provided herein.
3. ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 52 (1986).
4. YOSHIRO MASUMOTO, PLAYER AGENTS SYSTEM UNDER U.S. AND JAPANESE LAW 14 (2000).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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was entered into in 1968. 7
MLB has experienced a checkered history of labor strife, particularly over
the past half decade, punctuated by five player strikes, the first of which
occurred in 1972, and three lockouts initiated by the owners. 8 In recent years,
it appears, at least ostensibly, from the approach taken by the parties to
collective bargaining that they have come to the realization that the business of
professional baseball is a partnership, albeit an uneasy one, between the
players and the owners.
Since 1970, arbitration has been the designated means of resolving various
grievances that can arise between players and owners in the MLB. 9
Arbitration, the product of collective bargaining, 10 is used in the MLB to
review disciplinary determinations,"I to resolve ambiguities in the CBA, and
to determine fair and equitable means for establishing the salaries of players
who are eligible for arbitration. 12  The salary arbitration provision was
negotiated into the 1973 CBA between the MLB clubs and the MLBPA 13 and
first implemented in 1974.14
Free agency was first introduced into the MLB in 1975 through the
Messersmith/McNally arbitration decision. 15 In the MLB, "[a] player with six
or more years of Major League service who has not executed a contract for the
next season is eligible to become a free agent."' 16
By contrast, salary arbitration enables a player to re-negotiate his salary
with his team prior to becoming eligible for free agency.17 The purpose of
salary arbitration is to allow players whose salaries are not commensurate with
7. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, MLBPA Information: Frequently Asked Questions,
MLBPLAYERS.cOM, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp (last visited June 30, 2009)
[hereinafter MLBPA Information].
8. Id.
9. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, History of Major League Baseball Players
Association, MLBPLAYERS.cOM, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/infoihistory.jsp (last visited June 30,
2009).
10. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 471 (2006).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 504-07.
13. Id. at 504.
14. Rich Lederer, Comparing First-Year Eligible Arbitration Signings,
BASEBALLANALYSTS.COM, Feb. 23, 2009, http:/ibaseballanalysts.com/archives/2009/02/_birthdate_
ml-s.php.
15. BERRYETAL.,supra note 3, at 56-58.
16. A4LBPA Information, supra note 7; THE MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS AND THE MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION (MLBPA), 2007-2011 BASIC AGREEMENT Article XX - Reserve
System; Section B. Free Agency; (1) Eligibility, at 70 (Dec. 20, 2006).
17. YASSERETAL.,supra note 10, at 544.
2009]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
their performance the opportunity to argue for an increase in their salary so
that their compensation is consistent with other comparable players in the
league. 18
The CBA specifies when players are eligible to apply for salary
arbitration. In the MLB,
A player with three or more years of service, but less than six
years, may file for salary arbitration. In addition, a player can
be classified as a "Super Two" and be eligible for arbitration
with less than three years of service. A player with at least
two but less than three years of Major League service shall be
eligible for salary arbitration if he has accumulated at least 86
days of service during the immediately preceding season and
he ranks in the top 17 percent in total service in the class of
Players who have at least two but less than three years of
Major League service, however accumulated, but with at least
86 days of service accumulated during the immediately
preceding season. 19
The type of salary arbitration used in the MLB is distinct from other North
American professional sports leagues. The MLB uses a form of salary
arbitration referred to as "final offer" arbitration, also known as "high/low"
arbitration. 20 Under this format, both the player and the club submit a figure
to the arbitration panel, and the panel must select one of the two figures. 21 No
compromise or modification is permitted.22
Salary arbitrations in the MLB are decided by neutral third party
arbitrators.23 Under the terms of the CBA, the MLBPA and the MLB clubs
annually select the arbitrators who hear salary arbitration grievances. 24 In the
event they are unable to agree, the parties then jointly request that the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) furnish them with lists of prominent,
professional arbitrators from which the arbitrators are then selected by
18. BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 58.
19. Lederer, supra note 14; THE MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS AND THlE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION (MLBPA), 2007-2011 BASIC AGREEMENT Article VI - Salaries; Section F.
Salary Arbitration; (1) Eligibility, at 14 (Dec. 20, 2006).
20. BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 58.
21. YASSER ET AL., supra note 10, at 544.
22. Id. at 505.
23. Id. at 544.
24. Id.
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alternately striking names from the lists.25 All cases are assigned to three-
arbitrator panels, with each party designating one arbitrator to serve as the
panel chair. 26
While under the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, unions are the
"sole bargaining units" for unionized employees, the MLBPA permits its
members to be represented by agents in a variety of labor-related matters,
including contract negotiations and salary arbitration hearings. 27 While agents
were virtually non-existent in the MLB prior to the late 1960s, the use of
agents quickly became the norm in the 1970s and 1980s, and now, widespread
use of agents by players is commonplace. 28
III. LABOR RELATIONS AND SALARY ARBITRATION IN NIPPON PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL
The Nippon Baseball Players Association (JPBPA)
(* 7Qff*1i!k) was first established in 1980 to promote friendship
among players. 29 The organization later evolved into a union in 1985.30
Unlike the MLB, there is no collective bargaining agreement in the NPB.
31
Rather, the players' terms and conditions of employment are unilaterally set
by agreement among the owners, as embodied in the Yakyu Kyoyaku
( Q *,7"Q 7 Ir. "y -9 t) -)f 3* Sit% which contains the rules that govern
Japanese professional baseball. 32
Japanese teams are owned by large corporate conglomerates, with the
baseball club being a subsidiary of the larger parent organization. 33 As a
result, all the elements of a traditional Japanese business, such as lifetime
employment, are present among professional baseball teams in Japan. 34 The
25. Id.
26. THE MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS AND THE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION
(MLBPA), 2007-2011 BASIC AGREEMENT Article VI - Salaries; Section F. Salary Arbitration; (7)
Selection of Arbitrators, at 17 (Dec. 20, 2006).
27. Id.
28. MASUMOTO, supra note 4, at 15.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Certificate of Unionization - Japan Professional Baseball Players' Association (Nov. 5,
1985).
31. MASUMOTO, supra note 4, at 13, 15.
32. NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL, YAKYU KYOYAKU, (JAPANESE PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL BASIC AGREEMENT) (1995) [hereinafter NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL]. The
translations have been taken from the 1995 Yakyu Kyoyaku since the research conducted has not
revealed any substantive changes since 1995 to the articles or provisions examined in this study.
33. WHITING, supra note 1, at 89-90.
34. ROBERT WHITING, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE BAT: BASEBALL SAMURAI STYLE 20-
2009]
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relationship between the owners and players has a very strong paternalistic
component to it, which former NPB Commissioner Ichiro Yoshikuni
('Fq -9I) described in the following terms: "[w]e don't think of the
relationship between owners and players as a labor issue .... It's more like
the relationship between a parent and child."35
For much of the early history of the JPBPA, its members openly
expressed a general unwillingness to ever resort to going on strike.3 6 This
sentiment reflects several dominant Japanese cultural values including the
sublimation of self in favor of the group, deference to, and implicit trust of,
authority, and a strong desire to avoid confrontation and conflict. 37 Yomiuri
Giants (M, -V -f" 7 > 'Y) captain Kiyoshi Nakahata (43 2 R ) once stated
on national television, "[a]lthough we hope to work for higher pay and better
working conditions, we could never strike like the U.S. union has. It would
not be right."' 38 These sentiments have been echoed by many other players
over the years, such as slugger Kazuhiro Kiyohara (MARtW), who once
exclaimed, "A strike wouldn't be fair to the fans or the owners." 39
It was not until they formally become a union in 1985 that the players
even had the right to strike. 40 There has only been one strike in Japanese
baseball, which occurred in 2004 and it lasted only two days. 41 Free agency
was not introduced in Japanese baseball until 1993.42
In 2001, Japanese owners gave players permission to be represented by an
agent in contract negotiations. 43 However, the use of agents in Japan remains
extremely circumscribed. Agents must be Japanese attorneys and Japanese
citizens, and each agent is limited to representing only one player.44
Unlike the MLB, salary arbitration ( in the NPB is
21(1977).
35. In Japan, Baseball is the Art of War, Apr. 21, 1991, L.A. TIMES, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-21/sports/sp-906 Ijapanese-baseball.
36. WHITING, supra note 1, at 88.
37. CHIN-NING CHu, THE ASIAN MIND GAME: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF THE
ASIAN BUSINESS CULTURE: A WESTERNER'S SURVIVAL MANUAL 116-7 (1991).
38. WHITING, supra note 1, at 88.
39. Id. at 68.
40. Id. at 88.
41. ALAN M. KLEIN, GROWING THE GAME: THE GLOBALIZATION OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
156 (2006).
42. The Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum, A History of Japanese Baseball,
BASEBALLHALLOFFAMEANDMUSEUM.COM, http://english.baseball-museum.or.jp/showcase/storage/
history.html (last visited June 30, 2009).
43. WHITING, supra note 1, at 93-94.
44. Id.
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not the product of "good faith, arms length bargaining." Rather, like the other
rules governing the NPB, it was unilaterally instituted by the member clubs. 45
Since the owners created salary arbitration in Japan, the system heavily favors
management. Also, unlike the MLB, because there is no CBA in the NPB,
salary arbitration is embedded in Article 94 of the Yakyu Kyoyaku. 46 Article
94, as amended on September 14, 1973, states, "If a player is dissatisfied with
the terms of his contract for the upcoming season, and he and the team cannot
reach an agreement on a salary figure, then the player can petition the league
president for salary arbitration." 47
While Major League Baseball players have a right under the CBA to file
for salary arbitration, in Japanese baseball salary arbitration is more properly
characterized as a privilege that may be requested by a player, but that does
not have to be granted. This distinction was strikingly illustrated in the 2008
case of Takahiko "G.G." Sato (12- 4 ). Sato was the first Japanese player
to request salary arbitration since Tsuyoshi Shimoyanagi (FTODNIJ) in 2001,
and his would have been only the seventh salary arbitration case in the history
of Japanese baseball. 48  However, Pacific League (I' 5,' 7 - ''7 - 1) - -'.)
President Tadao Koike ('J' Y lA) refused to accept Sato's application for
salary arbitration, instead instructing Sato to continue negotiations with his
team, the Saitama Seibu Lions ( -1" 1J-/jC).49 Koike justified his
decision stating, "I concluded that there was room for talks. The general rule
is that players and clubs set annual salary through negotiations .... 50
As mentioned previously, Major League Baseball Players are eligible for
salary arbitration after a certain number of years of service. However, in
Japanese baseball, players are theoretically eligible for salary arbitration every
year, assuming that a Japanese player is unable to reach terms and conditions
45. NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL, supra note 32, at art. 94. The literal English translation
of this document can be confusing. This document is an agreement among the clubs in Japanese
baseball, and is not a collective bargaining agreement between the players and the clubs. In that
sense, this document is more properly characterized as the rules of Japanese Professional Baseball,
which have been unilaterally promulgated by the owners.
46. NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL, supra note 32, at art. 94.
47. Id. Article 94 of the Yakyu Kyoyaku indicates that this article was "amended" in 1973. A
copy of the basic agreement prior to that date could not be obtained. Consequently, it is unclear
whether salary arbitration was introduced in the NPB in 1973 or if it existed prior to that date and the
terms of that article were amended in 1973. See Table 1.
48. Kyodo News Service, Lions' Sato Seeks Salary Arbitration, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 9, 2008,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20080109j2.html [hereinafter Lions' Sato].
49. G.G. Sato in Limbo Over Salary, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb2008Ol24j 1 .html.
50. Id.
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of his contract with his club.51
To appreciate this concept, it is important to understand that until very
recently, most Japanese players, even superstars like Sadaharu Oh (TI.-)
and Shigeo Nagashima ( 1S [), played under one-year renewable
contracts.5 2 The pressure imposed by the threat of players defecting to the
Major Leagues has forced some Japanese owners to agree to longer term
contracts, but the vast majority of Japanese players still sign contracts on a
year-by-year basis, negotiating a new deal with their clubs prior to the
commencement of each season. However, while it may be the case that a
Japanese player could potentially request salary arbitration every year, a
player's ability to do so is extremely limited for a number of reasons.
First, within Japanese baseball, there is both an implicit and tacit
understanding that the player must first exhaust every possibility to reach an
agreement with his team before requesting arbitration. In fact, in many
circumstances, even after a player has requested arbitration, the arbitration
panel will ask the player to continue negotiations with his team, as highlighted
in the aforementioned Sato case.53 In 1996, after a tearful statement in which
he asked to be released or traded, disgruntled first baseman Hiroo Ishiii
(T i 4 An ) of the Kintetsu Buffaloes eventually settled his contract dispute
with his club, rather than choosing to pursue salary arbitration. 54 A year later,
Ishii's teammate Shigeki Sano (1. ,k,) applied for salary arbitration after
failing to reach an agreement with the Buffaloes for the upcoming season.55
However, after repeatedly being steered back to negotiations with his club,
Sano reluctantly agreed to terms with his team. 56 These examples reflect the
notion that at least in Japanese baseball, the cultural value in Japan of settling
disputes through compromise and consensus, as opposed to adversarial
proceedings, is still the norm.
Second, pursuing individual interests is often characterized as selfish
behavior in Japanese society, and speaking on behalf of one's own personal
interests and needs is widely regarded as an undesirable trait. Hiromitsu
51. Gary Garland, What Is the Difference Between Japanese and American Baseball
Arbitration?, BASEBALLGURU.COM., http:// baseballguru.com/ggarland/bbreadl4.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2009).
52. Id.
53. G.G. Sato in Limbo, supra note 49.
54. FSJ Sports, Ishii and Buffaloes - Still Fighting, JBASEBALL NEWS, Dec. 13, 1996, available
at http://www.fsjsports.com/jbaseball/basnews/ishiprob.html.
55. FSJ Sports, Sano Goes to Arbitration JBASEBALL NEWS, Feb. 1, 1997, available at
http://www.fsjsports.com/jbaseball/97news/O201_sano.html.
56. FSJ Sports, Sano Agrees to Contract Before Arbitration, JBASEBALL NEWS, Feb. 12, 1997,
available at http://www.fsjsports.com/jbaseball/97news/0212_sano.html.
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Ochiai (-'I'lAA), the first Japanese player to ever request salary arbitration,
experienced enormous social pressure when he made his request, even though
he declared that his objective in seeking salary arbitration was to promote an
increase in all players' salaries. 57
Finally, Japanese players realize that the likelihood that they will prevail
in a salary arbitration case is extremely remote, for reasons that will become
apparent later in this article. Therefore, while many players may feel
dissatisfied about their contract negotiations with their team, they do not
pursue salary arbitration because of the social and institutional pressures
placed upon them, coupled with the pragmatic reality that they have little
chance of prevailing.
The main reason salary arbitration offers little hope to Japanese players
relates to the structure of salary arbitration in the NPB. Unlike the MLB,
which employs neutral third party arbitrators for its salary arbitrations, salary
arbitrations in Japan are reviewed by a three-person panel consisting of the
NPB commissioner and the two league presidents pursuant to Article 95 of the
Yakyu Kyoyaku. 58 Article 95 states, "Once the league president receives a
salary arbitration request from a player, he shall set-up an arbitration panel.
The arbitration panel shall consist of the commissioner and the two league
presidents. The chairman of the panel shall be the commissioner." 59
The individuals selected to fill the positions of commissioner and league
presidents are chosen by the Japanese club owners, who pay their salaries, and
to whom they are accountable for their actions. 60  Consequently, the
widespread view among the players is that they have little or no chance of
prevailing in salary arbitration. This perception is supported by the data. As
described in greater detail later in this article, only one Japanese player has
ever prevailed in a salary arbitration case before the panel. 61
In response to lopsided composition of the salary arbitration panel, the
JPBPA has attempted to change the structure of salary arbitration to allow a
representative selected by the players to serve on the panel, 62 but thus far,
these efforts have been unsuccessful.
Compounding the difficulties associated with facing a decidedly pro-
57. James B. Dworkin & Gregory S. Jelf, Labor Relations in Japanese Baseball, BASEBALL
ECONOMICS: CURRENT RESEARCH 204 (1996).
58. Id. at 201-02.
59. NIPPoN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL, supra note 32, at art. 95.
60. Dworkin & Jelf, supra note 57, at 202.
61. Lions' Sato, supra note 48.
62. Kyodo News Service, Baseball Players Want Representation in Pay Arbitration, JAPAN
ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Mar. 18, 1996 [hereinafter Baseball Players Want Representation].
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management arbitration panel, players were not permitted to be represented by
an agent in contract negotiations and salary arbitration until 2001.63 Japanese
management contended that the use of agents would create a contentious
atmosphere that would undermine the spirit of cooperation in negotiations
with players. 64 Also, the act of hiring an agent by a player was viewed by the
clubs as a breach of the trust relationship between the team and player.65
Despite the rule allowing agents, some Japanese owners have made it clear
that they will not negotiate with player agents under any circumstances. For
example, Tsuneo Watanabe (RIM-9), the autocratic leader of Japan's most
prominent team, the Yomiuri Giants ( "', -"7> 'Y), stated
emphatically, "If one of my players brings an agent into contract negotiations,
then we'll cut his salary." 66
Salary arbitration decisions in the NPB are purportedly based upon a 250-
point checklist system that not only takes into consideration individual
statistics to measure player performance, but also more abstract qualities such
as team play and mental sharpness on the field as well. 67 It is the opinion of
many on the side of management that this diagnostic tool for assessing a
player's value obviates the need for agents and salary arbitrations. 68
Pursuant to Article 96 of the Yakyu Kyoyaku, "The arbitration panel gives
suggestions about salary and the dispute must be heard (settled) within thirty
days of receipt of the salary arbitration request by the league president." 69
Article 97 specifies that, "If the team refuses salary arbitration, they lose
the rights to the player. If the player refuses salary arbitration, the league
president shall announce that the player has voluntarily retired from the
game." 70
The following chart summarizes some of the hallmark dates and key facts
in labor relations in the NPB and MLB:
63. WHITING, supra note 1, at 93.
64. Id. at 87-95.
65. Id
66. WHITING, supra note 1, at 94.
67. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Baseball Salary Arbitration in Japan, 9 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 17, 18
(1992).
68. Id.
69. NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL, supra note 32, at art. 96.
70. NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL, supra note 32, at art. 97; Ted Brock, The Japanese Put
the Arbitrary in Baseball Wage Arbitration, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at 2.
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TABLE 1:
Event Major League Baseball Nippon Professional Baseball
Labor Union Established 1966 1985
Number of Strikes 5 1
Number of Lockouts 3 0
First Strike 197271 2004
First CBA 1968 NA
Free Agency Established 1975 1993
Salary Arbitration Established 1973 197371
Player Agents Introduced c 1967 2001
IV. JAPANESE SALARY ARBITRATION CASES
To date, there have only been six decisions by the salary arbitration panel
in Nippon Professional Baseball. By contrast, from 1974 to 2008, arbitrators
have ruled on behalf of the players 206 times and clubs 280 times, with many
more disputes settling before the arbitration panel made any determination. 73
Two of the salary arbitration decisions in Japanese baseball involved
foreign players. The first salary arbitration in Japanese baseball, which
occurred in 1973, involved Leon McFadden (L,7t> 7 ' 7 7 -f>), a
former Major League player with the Houston Colt .45s and Astros. 74
McFadden played one season in Japan with the Hanshin Tigers
(P1RWW -f )i - 7) in 1972, and requested salary arbitration for the following
year. 75 In 1998, Dominican Alfonso Soriano (7)[,7 7 > ' } - ') 7-./)
became another foreign player (,[M..JKT-) playing in Japan to request
salary arbitration. 76 In both instances, these players lost their arbitrations,
resulting in their retirements from Japanese baseball. 77 In McFadden's case,
71. This was the year of the first strike in professional baseball under the modem union. Ty
Cobb orchestrated a one day "strike" among his teammates on the Detroit Tigers in 1912, but this was
not a true labor strike. Also, the Brotherhood of Ball Players orchestrated at strike in the late 1800s,
but they were not part of Major League Baseball. BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 58.
72. Data insufficient to determine whether salary arbitration was instituted in the NPB in 1973,
or if it existed prior to that date and was amended in 1973.
73. Maury Brown, Arbitration Scorecard, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM, Feb. 20, 2009,
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=719&Itemid= 16;
see also MLBPA Information, supra note 7.
74. Leon McFadden Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/players/m/mcfadle0l .shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
75. Arbitrators to Rule on Ochiai's Contract, JAPAN ECONOMiC NEWSWIRE, FEB. 14, 1991.
76. CODY MONK, ALFONSO SORIANO: THE DOMINICAN DREAM COME TRUE 73 (2003).
77. Id. at 73-74.
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the decision spelled the end to his professional baseball career, while Soriano
went on to star in MLB.
Soriano played for the Hiroshima Toyo Carp (M-.W5)J-7) from
1996-1997, after having been signed at the age of seventeen out of one of the
many Dominican baseball academies run by Japanese teams. 78 After the 1997
season, Soriano was approached by agent Don Nomura ([ff #), who
represented Nomo and Hideki Irabu (PA Xt ), among others. 79 Nomura
used the press to expose to the public what he viewed as a system of
exploitation through which Japanese teams took advantage of inexpensive
Dominican labor to fill their rosters. 80 Nomura sought a salary for Soriano
that was comparable to, but still considerably less than, what other foreign
players were making in Japan. 81 When contract negotiations with the Carp
reached a stalemate, Soriano's case went to the arbitration panel, which ruled
for the club. 82 Nomura was not permitted to appear on Soriano's behalf.
Subsequently, as the result of clever strategic maneuvering by Nomura,
Soriano was declared a free agent by his team, thus clearing the path for his
career in MLB. 83
The other four arbitrations have involved Japanese players. The first of
these, in 1991, involved three-time NPB triple crown winner Hiromitsu Ochiai
(,3-61,-fW5 ).8 4  Prior to his salary arbitration, Ochiai was infamous for
notoriously making a "pay me or trade me" demand to his previous club, the
Lotte Orions (1Q 'Y 5 ; ) 7'7). 85  The Orions granted his request and
traded him to the Chunichi Dragons (' H F5?1 -  > X) in 1987.86
In a society that does not value individualism, Ochiai was scornfully
viewed by some Japanese as a rebellious individual hero, while to others he
came to represent a fundamental paradigm shift in societal attitudes and
national cultural values. 87 Ochiai, who represented himself during his hearing
78. Marty Kuehnert, Japan Baseball So Lame Even Imports Leave, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/sp2002082 lmk.html.
79. Id
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Id.; see also WHITING, supra note 1, at 141-45.
84. Shropshire, supra note 67, at 17.
85. Kuehnert, supra note 77.
86. Dworkin & Jelf, supra note 57, at 203.
87. Michael Shapiro, Designated Rebel, WORLD MONITOR, Apr.1993, at 52; Michael Shapiro,
Japanese Hero Doing Things His Way, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1987, at D27, D29; Michael Shapiro,
Japanese Baseball Star Risks Acceptance with Individualism, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 24, 1987, at
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before the arbitration panel, 88 lost his case.
Ochiai's arbitration was followed in 1993 by the salary arbitration of
Yokohama Bay Stars (70Z71':,, -Z) infielder Yutaka Takagi
(iA*tW). 89  The same panel that had found against Ochiai also decided
against Takagi. 90
The 1996 salary arbitration decision in favor of the Orix Blue Wave, and
against player Takahito Nomura ([44ftf-), prompted the JPBPA's
aforementioned failed request for a player representative on the salary
arbitration panel. 91  The ruling against Nomura was the fourth decision
rendered by the panel, all of which favored the clubs. It was the third decision
against a Japanese player in five years. Convinced that the process was unfair
and that the panel was disproportionately composed in favor of the owners, the
union attempted to persuade the owners of the need for player representation
on the panel, but to no avail. 92
The last salary arbitration decision in the NPB came in 2001. 93 That case,
involving Tsuyoshi Shimoyanagi ('1]9IJ N!) of the Nippon Ham Fighters
(t H 1 \/ A 7 -7' 4 W -X), was significant for two reasons. First, it was the
only time a Japanese player prevailed in a decision by the three-person salary
arbitration panel. 94 Second, it marked the first time a player was represented
in a salary arbitration case before the arbitration panel by an agent, with
Japanese attorney Masataka Uesugi (E1 t [W) representing Shimoyanagi. 95
However, while Shimoyanagi's arbitration was groundbreaking for those
reasons, it would be misleading to characterize that decision as having a
significant impact upon subsequent salary arbitrations disputes within the
NPB. Since that decision in 2001, there have been no further rulings by the
salary arbitration panel.
The following table provides a comprehensive overview of all the salary
88. Actually, it could be said that Ochiai did have an "agent" of sorts, in the person of his wife,
Nobuko Ochiai (S*G--). Like her husband, she was flamboyant and outspoken, and used the
press to openly pitch her husband's case for a higher salary, among other things. Jonathan Friedland,
Mrs. Baseball, 157 FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., May 19, 1994, at 66.
89. Dworkin & Jelf, supra note 57, at 204.
90. Id. As Table 2 reflects, the arbitration panel actually awarded Takagi slightly more than what
the team had offered, but in Japanese yen, this amount was so minimal, particularly considering what
the player was requesting, that it is considered insignificant.
91. Baseball Players Want Representation, supra note 62.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Shimoyanagi Makes Final Appeal, JAPAN TiMES, Feb. 2, 2001, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20010202a I.html.
95. Id.
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arbitration decisions in the NPB:
TABLE 2:96
Amount Amount Arbitration ruling
Year Player Team desired Offered by by panel
by Team
player
1973 Leon McFadden Hanshin Tigers
L ;r:/>" 71Y 77- > fK*3Z4-r-x * 900)7 60077 V 60077
1991 Hiromitsu Ochiai Chunichi Dragons 9 22 V 212 V 22
CPH 70007" 200077 20007Y
1993 Yutaka Takagi Yokohama Bay Stars 1' *t ¥93307 V 984077
X;ff v,,i,,( 7. 1-x- 2637Y
1996 Takahito Nomura Orix Blue Wave V 650077 * 39007" V 39005"
4fl ( Y') "Jb)-~---) ___
1998 Alfonso Soriano Hiroshima Carp
?)1,77>'.,. J )- J (V/ tJ j- " 21457" 5857T" ¥5857"
2001 Tsuyoshi Shimoyanagi Nippon Ham Fighters * I it *t IN * IS
*\AK \7 7 4 $1-X 50007" 37507Y 40007
The data in this table reveals another distinction between salary arbitration
in MLB and NPB. As both the Takagi and Shimoyanagi decisions indicate,
unlike its United States counterpart, the Japanese arbitration panel is not
limited to selecting one of the two figures presented to them in the arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
It could be said that the differences in labor relations and the approach to
salary arbitration in the NPB and MLB are the result of cultural differences.
But which culture? One could argue that the practices in Japanese
professional baseball are not influenced as much by national culture as they
are by the organizational culture within the NPB. The NPB is a patriarchal
organization, steeped in tradition, and run by willful, autocratic owners who
are used to getting their way.
96. Japanese Professional Baseball Players' Ass'n (JPBPA) (I 7Ii )
JPBPA.NET, http://JPBPA.net/index.htm (visited June 30, 2009); Michael Westbay, Individual
Players, JAPANESEBASEBALL.COM, http://japanesebaseball.com/players/index.jsp (visited June 30,
2009); Legend: "Man" (J-) yen (¥) and "Oku" (1) yen (*) are units used for discussing salaries.
1 7Y(man)= 10,000. 1 (oku) = 10,0007" = 100,000,000.
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While there has been some gradual change in the NPB, largely caused by
the pressure on the NPB from the exodus of Japanese stars to the MLB, the
JPBPA still has nowhere near the power wielded by the MLBPA. Although
competition for Japanese baseball players on the global market place has
increased, the NPB owners have steadfastly adhered to their dogmatic, insular
approach, continuing to be grudgingly stingy in acquiescing to the requests of
the Japanese players, even while the league deteriorates around them. While
events like the first strike in the history of the NPB in 2004, and the first
player victory in salary arbitration in 2001, are significant, there was little
momentum built around those isolated successes. Professional baseball in
Japan is changing, but at an excruciatingly sluggish pace. Consequently, it is
unlikely, in the current environment, that there will be any dramatic change to
the current status of salary arbitration in Japanese baseball at anytime in the
near future.

